MCP security proxy
Your AI agents already touch your systems.
ShieldAgent decides what each one is allowed to do — before it reaches a system — and leaves the proof.
Every tool call your agents make passes through ShieldAgent first, and is allowed, blocked, or rewritten against your policy. You can start with nothing blocked at all.
One connection to change. Shadow Mode first, so agent behaviour stays exactly as it is.
MCP — Model Context Protocol
How AI agents connect to the world
MCP is the open standard that lets AI agents call external tools — files, databases, APIs, and more. ShieldAgent sits between your agents and every tool call, making security and compliance automatic.
The problem
Why do I need this?
Your agent receives a tool call and decides on its own whether to run it. Between that decision and your database, there is nothing that can say no.
That gap is already being used. A July 2025 internet scan found 1,862 public MCP servers responding to unauthenticated requests, and in September 2025 Koi Security disclosed the first malicious MCP server found in the wild, installed by roughly 300 organisations.
The bill usually arrives somewhere else first: in your sales cycle. Your customer's security questionnaire has stopped asking whether you encrypt at rest. It now asks what your agent can do, who limits it, and how you prove it. When the answer is a paragraph of good intentions, the contract waits.
What it does
What does it do?
It catches the instruction hidden in the content your agent just read.A ticket, a page, an email can carry a line telling the agent to do something else — send data out, call a different tool. That's prompt injection, and ShieldAgent flags it before the call goes out.
It notices when a tool stops matching what you approved. A connected server can quietly change what a tool does after you've already trusted it — tool poisoning. ShieldAgent checks each call against the definition you signed off on, and flags the drift.
It stops the data before it leaves, not after. Credentials, customer records, anything matching a pattern you define — ShieldAgent inspects the response and strips or blocks it inline. That is DLP, running on every call.
It decides before the tool ever sees the request. Each call is checked against what that specific agent may do with that specific tool — least-privilege enforced per call, not granted once and left alone.
It keeps a record nobody can quietly edit. Every decision lands in a tamper-evident audit trail the moment it happens. Alter an entry afterward and that shows up — which is what makes it evidence, not just a log.
It gives every agent a passport you can actually hand a client. The Agent Passport is a live page per agent: what it's allowed to call, what's been blocked, its current risk score — kept current automatically, not written once and left to go stale.
How does it work?
Your agents point at ShieldAgent instead of pointing at the tool. That is the only change.
Proof
Why believe this?
Every decision lands in a SHA-256 hash chain with hourly Merkle root snapshots. An event deleted or altered afterwards is detectable — which is the property an auditor is actually testing for.
Reports are generated from those records for SOC 2, ISO/IEC 42001, the EU AI Act (Annex IV technical documentation and Article 73 incident reporting) and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. They are evidence to hand to an auditor. They are not a certification, and each report says so on its own face.
The underlying problem is public and dated. A command-injection flaw in the STDIO transport of the official MCP SDKs was disclosed by OX Security in April 2026; the Cloud Security Alliance catalogued seven or more critical and high CVEs a month later.
We say tamper-evident, not tamper-proof. It is the term our own engineering documentation uses, and it is what the hash chain guarantees: that manipulation is detected, not that it is impossible.
Three public breaches used MCP as the attack vector — Supabase via Cursor, the postmark-mcp package, and CVE-2025-6514 in mcp-remote. ShieldAgent inspects all three vectors: prompt-injection detection, MCP server identity validation, and supply-chain manifest verification.
For your role
Read the version that matters to you
For security teams
What gets inspected, how a policy is written, and what happens when ShieldAgent itself is unavailable.
/for/securityFor compliance and risk
Which framework maps to which evidence, what a report contains, and what it deliberately does not claim.
/for/complianceFor CTOs and founders
What an unanswered questionnaire costs, what a pilot involves, and what has to be true for this to be worth your time.
/for/leadershipFAQ
Start with a pilot
Start with a pilot
Two weeks, in Shadow Mode, against your own agents. At the end you get the call log, the policy set we would have enforced, and the list of calls that would have been blocked. If that list comes back empty, that is a useful answer too.